How does the market value "toxic" structured-credit securities? We study the valuation of what is possibly the most toxic of all toxic assets: the equity tranche of a CDO. In theory, CDO equity should be similar in nature to bank stock since both represent residual claims on a portfolio of loans. We find that CDO equity returns are much more related to stock returns than to fixed income returns. CDO equity returns track the returns of financial stocks much more closely than any other industry. Nearly two-thirds of the variation in CDO returns can be explained by fundamentals.
I. Introduction
Prior to the current financial crisis, much of the innovation in financial markets was directed to the creation of structured investment vehicles that allowed investors to take highly leveraged positions in portfolios of assets.
1 The securitized-credit market, in particular, has received a significant amount of attention for its prominent role in the international financial crisis. Given the huge losses that investors have suffered in the complex and opaque securitized-credit market, it is not surprising that these types of investments have frequently been termed "toxic" assets.
One of the most controversial aspects of the securitized-credit market is the issue of how these structured types of securities are valued in the financial markets. On one hand, many argue that the complexity and lack of transparency of these instruments allowed them to be issued as highly-rated investment-grade securities at premium valuations.
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On the other hand, a key premise behind many of the recent troubled-asset programs implemented by the Treasury and the Federal Reserve was that these investments were discounted in the market at illiquid fire-sale prices far below their intrinsic worth.
3 Thus, securitized-credit investments are viewed as having alternated between being overvalued and undervalued by the financial markets.
1 Examples include collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), structured investment vehicles (SIVs), and conduits that synthesize highly-rated debt instruments from portfolios of high-yield bonds or subprime loans, collateralized fund obligations (CFOs) that create leveraged hedge-fund-like structures, and total rate of return swaps (TRORS) that parallel the ownership of stock without the use of the balance sheet.
In an effort to shed light on the important issue of how the market values these types of assets, this paper studies the valuation of what is probably the most toxic of all toxic assets: the equity tranche of a collateralized debt obligation (CDO), or CDO equity. The "toxicity" of this asset arises because CDO equity represents the residual claim position in a leveraged CDO capital structure. The expected loss on CDO equity is often so large that CDO equity trades at prices of one or two for a notional amount of 100. In this analysis, we make use of an extensive proprietary data set made available to us by a major fixed-income asset management firm. The data consists of daily traded tranche prices on both the CDX investment grade and high yield indexes.
We begin by describing the characteristics of CDO equity. In theory, CDO equity should have similarities with bank stock since both are residual claims to the cash flows of a portfolio of loans. A direct implication of this is that investors in financial markets may price CDO equity in a way that mirrors the pricing of bank stock. On the other hand, there are important differences between CDO equity and bank stock. For example, CDOs are generally based on static portfolios. In contrast, banks manage their credit portfolios dynamically. From this perspective, CDO equity is to bank stock what a passive index fund is to an actively managed fund. Clearly, however, the issue of whether CDO equity and bank stock are priced similarly in the market is an empirical one.
To address this issue, we first compare the properties of CDO equity returns with those of other major asset classes such as stocks, Treasury bonds, corporate bonds, and mortgage backed securities. We find that CDO equity returns are much more closely related to stock returns in terms of their means, excess returns, standard deviations, and market betas than to any of the fixed income returns. For example, CDO equity betas closely parallel the stock return betas of firms with similar leverage ratios.
We next examine the relation between CDO equity returns and stock returns by industry. Specifically, we regress CDO equity returns on the returns of Fama-French industry portfolios. Our objective in estimating these regressions is to identify which industry returns are the most related to CDO equity returns. As expected, the returns for the financial industry are significantly related to CDO equity returns in all cases.
Furthermore, the banking industry is by far the most dominant of all the industries in terms of its explanatory power for CDO equity returns. Thus, not only does CDO equity behave like stock, it behaves most like stock in the financial industry. These results provide empirical support for the view that the market values CDO equity and bank stock consistently.
Using individual stock returns for several hundred banks, we conduct a cross sectional analysis to identify the characteristics of the banks which have the highest correlation with CDO equity returns. We find that there is a strong positive relation between bank size and its correlation with CDO equity. This relation holds true not only among the 30 largest banks (many of which were major CDO issuers), but also among the smallest banks in the sample. Furthermore, after controlling for size, we find significant relations to the fraction of commercial loans to total assets. These results are also consistent with the interpretation of CDO equity as stock in banks with portfolios of commercial loans similar to those in the CDX index.
Finally, following (Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) , we examine how much of the variation in CDO equity returns can be explained on the basis of fundamental CDO valuation models such as (Duffie and Gârleanu (2001) , Longstaff and Rajan (2008) , and others. We find that 45 to 64 percent of the returns to CDO equity are linked to variables driving the distribution of losses on an underlying investment grade credit portfolio. These variables also have significant explanatory power for CDOs which are based on portfolios of high yield bonds, although the fraction of the variation explained is not as high. Additionally, we find that the fundamentals that explain investment grade CDO equity also explain the returns to bank stock.
These results have a number of important implications. First, the results provide new perspectives on the relationship between CDO equity and the stock of traditional financial institutions. The term "shadow-banking system" has been used to describe some of the complex, highly levered, and largely unregulated securities created by Wall Street. 4 We show that the term "shadow bank" is a particularly apt description of CDO equity, both conceptually as well as empirically. Also, finding that much of the variation in CDO equity returns can be explained by credit valuation models indicates that the market values even the most toxic of assets rationally in terms of their economic fundamentals.
This paper contributes to the rapidly growing literature on securitized credit. Longstaff (2010) consider the effects of risk transfer between securitized-credit markets and other financial institutions and markets.
In an important recent paper, Schleifer and Vishny (1992) study the pricing of the ABX.HE indexes, which are based on credit default swaps (CDS) on baskets of mortgagebacked securities. In this paper we focus instead on the equity tranche of a CDO structure based on a basket of CDS contracts on corporate debt. Thus our results compliment those of Stanton and Wallace. In another recent paper, Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009a) model the prices of senior CDO tranches. This paper complements Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009a) by focusing on the opposite end of the capital structure, the equity tranche of the CDO.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an introduction to CDO equity, discusses the conceptual relation between CDO equity and bank stock and describes the data used in this study. Section III focuses on the relation between CDO equity and stock market factors. Section IV examines whether CDO equity is priced like bank stock in particular. Section V examines which banks are most similar to CDO equity. Section VI examines the pricing of CDO equity in relation to fundamentals.
Section VII concludes.
II. CDO Equity
In this section we provide a brief introduction to CDO equity. One of the most important types of securitized-credit structures in the financial markets has been the collateralized debt or loan obligation. Until the subprime crisis of 2007, CDO issuance exceeded $100 billion per year. Assets that have been securitized by CDOs included investment-grade bonds, high-yield bonds, emerging market debt, leveraged loans, middle-market loans, trust preferred securities, credit card receivables, prime and subprime home equity mortgages, asset-backed securities, commercial mortgages, and even previously issued CDO tranches.
6 While the securitization of certain asset portfolios have been reduced by the financial crisis, some assets, such as mortgages, continue to be securitized in large amounts.
To illustrate how CDO equity is structured, we consider a simple example based on a diversified portfolio of corporate loans. Imagine that a CDO issuer has a portfolio of 100 loans on its balance sheet that it wishes to securitize. Each loan has a face amount of $1 million, is worth par, and has a ten-year maturity. In addition, each loan is to a different corporate borrower. The total value of the loan portfolio is $100 million. To sell the portfolio, the CDO issuer could sell the entire portfolio to a single buyer as a whole, or sell the portfolio in tranches as a CDO to multiple buyers.
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The CDO equity tranche represents the residual claim on the portfolio of loans and is structured in the following way. First, the CDO issuer determines the total notional amount of the tranche, say, ten percent of the total value of the portfolio ($10 million). By definition, this tranche absorbs the first ten percent of any defaults on the entire portfolio.
Thus, this equity tranche is said to have a thickness of ten percent (and is analogous to the percentage of equity capital in a bank). In exchange for being the residual claimant, the equity tranche will receive a coupon rate of perhaps 500 basis points above Treasuries.
If there are no defaults, the buyer of the equity tranche earns a high coupon rate for ten years and then receives back his $10 million notional investment. If, for example, four of the firms default (and assuming that there is zero recovery in the event of default), the equity tranche absorbs the $4 million loss to the portfolio and the notional amount of the equity tranche is reduced to $6 million. Going forward, the equity tranche investor receives the 500 basis point coupon spread as before, only now on the $6 million notional.
If six or more additional firms default, the equity tranche absorbs additional losses of $6 million, the notional amount of the equity tranche investors position is completely wiped out, and the investor receives neither coupons nor principal going forward. Because a 10-percent loss in the portfolio translates into a 100-percent loss for the equity tranche investor, the equity tranche investor is leveraged 10 to 1.
The CDO issuer would then continue to create more senior tranches, each designed to absorb losses after the capital in the more junior tranches is extinguished. Taken together, a set of tranches might include the 0-10 percent equity tranche, and 10-15, 15-25, 25-35, and 35-100 percent tranches. 7 This example parallels Longstaff and Rajan (2008) . Also see the illustration of a subprime homeequity asset-backed CDO structure in Longstaff (2010) .
8 In our example, the CDO is based on a portfolio of debt securities and is referred to as a cash CDO.
Credit markets have also introduced synthetic CDOs which are similar to a cash CDOs, but are based
A. CDO Equity and Bank Stock
By absorbing the first credit losses on the underlying portfolio, the equity tranche has a key role in the CDO capital structure as the residual claim on the underlying credit portfolio. Thus, despite being typically viewed as a fixed-income security, the designation of this tranche as equity is actually a very apt description in the usual stock-market sense. For example, the simple fact that CDO equity has the word equity in the title is a reflection of the widespread belief in financial markets that CDO equity can be viewed as "synthetic stock." To see the intuition behind this, recall that many CDOs were created by banks and other financial institutions spinning off their assets into structured portfolios with capital structures closely paralleling those of the original institutions. For example, Table 1 shows the balance sheet for a hypothetical bank with a portfolio of loans on the asset side, and different layers of debt and equity on the liability side. Contrast this balance sheet with that which would be created by spinning off these assets into a CDO structure with tranches mimicking the capital structure of the bank. As can be seen, the two balance sheets are essentially equivalent. From this perspective, it would not be surprising for market participants to view CDO equity as being analogous to bank equity. Thus, to the extent that stocks are driven by unique factors (such as sentiment, liquidity, etc.) not shared by fixed-income markets, these factors could possibly show up in CDO equity returns.
Of course, in reality, practitioners are well aware that this analogy can only be taken so far. Actual banks are different from these CDO "shadow banks" in a number of important ways. These include, but are not limited to, an actual bank having growth options, a more diversified and actively managed portfolio of assets, and potentially more on a basket of credit default swap (CDS) contracts rather than an actual portfolio of debt securities. If there is a default on the underlying reference debt security, then the buyer of protection is able to put the defaulted bond or loan to the protection seller and receive par. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, the two types of CDOs are economically equivalent.
diversified operations (such as brokerage, investment banking services, and proprietary trading activities). Additionally, deposits and other sources of funding for actual banks are subject to "runs" or other liquidity shocks (such as those initiated by regulators) whereas funding for CDOs is essentially "locked in." 9 While we do not wish to minimize these substantive differences, significant similarities between these two structures remain.
The percentage of equity capital in a commercial bank is analogous to the thickness of the equity tranches in a CDO. For example, a CDO equity tranche with a thickness of 10 percent is analogous to a stylized bank with ten percent equity capital. It is important to recognize that equity tranches with different thicknesses can be constructed by combining the equity tranche with tranches that are more senior in the capital structure. For example, an investor could construct a 0-15 percent equity tranche by buying both the 0-10 percent equity tranche and the 10-15 percent junior mezzanine tranche. This is because the investor would absorb the first 15 percent of credit losses (the first 10 percent via the equity tranche, and the next 5 percent via the junior mezzanine tranche).
Similarly, the investor could construct a 0-20 percent equity tranche by buying the 0-10, 10-15, and 15-20 percent tranches, and so forth. Thus we can create CDO equity tranches with varying degrees of leverage.
B. Data
In this study, we focus on CDO equity with cash flows tied to the most liquid U.S. defined premium based on the equally-weighted basket of its constituents. 9 We thank an anonymous referee for this observation. We will focus on weekly CDO equity returns throughout the analysis, where the returns are based on Wednesday data (Tuesday when market data for Wednesday is not available). Given the points-up-front price for the CDO equity tranches, computing weekly returns is straightforward. Let p t be the points-up-front price of a CDO tranche with thickness L. At time t, we construct a funded CDO equity position by buying a riskless floating-rate note with coupon r t and notional amount 1, and receiving an upfront payment of p t for bearing the first credit losses on the underlying credit portfolio.
Thus, the initial cost of the portfolio is (1 − p t ). At time t + 1, the portfolio is liquidated at current market prices. Specifically, the cash generated by liquidation is the sum of
, where the first term is the accrued interest on the floating-rate note and the second term is the cash generated by liquidating the floatingrate note and credit protection leg (taking into account the impact of any realized credit losses x t+1 on the CDX index during the return period).
10 Table 2 contains summary statistics for the weekly return data of our CDX equity tranches. We also include the coefficient estimate from an AR(1) regression on the weekly data where a negative coefficient could signal measurement error. For weekly returns, none of the CDX equity tranches display a significant and negative coefficient estimate.
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III. Is CDO Equity Like Stock?
As discussed in Section A, there are many economic similarities between CDO equity and bank stock. A first step in studying how the market values CDO equity is to examine whether or not CDO equity returns are similar to stock returns in general. In terms of their first moments, the mean returns of all the CDX equity tranches and equity indexes are all negative, while the mean returns to the fixed income indexes are all positive. Thus, CDO equity is more like stock than fixed income securities in terms of average returns. In terms of their volatilities, CDO equity appears to be much more similar to stocks as opposed to the fixed income securities. In particular, CDO equity volatilities are most similar to the volatilities of the bank indexes, which are as much as twice that of the general equity indexes (the S&P 500 and CRSP VW indexes). Only the IG 30 tranche has a volatility that is less than the general equity market indexes.
Not surprisingly, the volatility of the CDX IG tranches is increasing with leverage.
The tranches whose volatilities are most similar to the bank indexes are those whose equity capital is 10-and 15-percent (with volatilities of 6.20 and 3.70 percent, respectively). This is similar to the equity capital range of the typical bank. By comparison, the volatility of the bank indexes range between 2.46 percent for the small regional banks and 4.52 percent for the Wall Street banks. So it appears the the volatility of the CDX IG tranches is close to the volatility of similarly levered banks.
By way of comparison, the volatilities of the fixed income indexes are much smaller, typically only about one tenth the volatility of the CDX equity tranches. Thus, at first glance, the returns to CDO equity appears to be more similar to the stock indexes than the fixed income indexes.
To further examine the relationship between CDO equity and stock market factors, we regress weekly excess CDX equity returns within a single-factor model for equity returns as well as a Fama-French three-factor model,
where R t is the excess weekly return to CDO equity, MKT t is the weekly Fama-French excess market return, and SMB t and HML t are thee weekly Fama-French size and value factors, respectively.
Results of this analysis can be seen in Table 3 . Panel A of presents the results of the single-factor model and Panel B presents the results of the Fama-French three-factor model. One question that has been studied in the mutual fund literature is whether actively managed mutual funds add value relative to their passively managed counterparts.
An analogous question could be raised here: do relatively passive "shadow banks", which do not have employee salaries to pay or similar levels of regulation with which to comply, outperform their actively managed and heavily regulated counterparts on a risk-adjusted basis? Panel A of Table 3 does not support the idea that they do; the alphas of all the CDX equity and bank indexes are statistically insignificant. The alphas of the FamaFrench three-factor model in Panel B are negative and significant for two of the bank indexes, however, while the alphas of the CDX equity tranches are not significant above the ten-percent level (though they are negative). The result in Panel B provides weak evidence that the passively managed "shadow banks" outperform their active counterparts on a risk-adjusted basis.
Turning our attention to the estimated market betas, in Panel A we find that the CDX IG equity tranches have market betas that are significant at a reasonable confidence 12 Weekly equity returns are calculated similar to the weekly CDX equity returns, as discussed in Section B.
interval. The beta exposure increases almost monotonically with leverage within the CDX IG equity tranches. For the least levered CDX IG tranche, IG 30 , beta is 0.35 while the beta exposure for the most highly levered tranche, IG 3 , is 1.82. By comparison, the beta exposure for our bank indexes ranges from 0.77 for the small regional banks, to 1.37 for the Wall Street banks. In terms of their leverage and the credit quality of their asset portfolio, the IG 10 and IG 15 tranches are most similar to banks, and their market betas are 1.48 and 0.85, respectively. Thus, in terms of their beta exposure, CDX IG equity is similar to that of similarly levered banks. The CDX HY market betas range between 1.02 and 1.69 and increase monotonically with leverage. However, only the two most levered CDX HY equity tranches (HY 10 and HY 15 ) have market betas whose statistical significance is above the ten-percent level.
By way of comparison, the Treasury, investment grade, finance industry, and mortgagebacked securities indexes have economically insignificant market betas (all less than 0.012, though the Treasury index is statistically significant at −0.055) and don't appear to behave like stock at all in this regard. Consistent with the findings of previous work, however, the high yield index has a statistically significant market beta of 0.25 and does appear to be affected by stock market factors, though its equity beta is lower than CDX equity tranches.
The results for market beta exposure is qualitatively similar when a Fama-French three-factor model is used in Panel B. Taken together, the results for market betas in Table 3 are consistent with CDX equity being priced similar to stock, and this is not generally true for the fixed income securities.
We examine the effect of leverage on market betas (as measured by equity capital in banks, or the equity tranche thickness in the case of CDX equity) in Figure 1 . To do this, we create three new bank indexes based on their equity capital. The first index includes banks whose equity capital is between 0-7 percent, the second between 7-10 percent, and the third between 10-15 percent (very few banks have equity capital greater than 15 percent). We then plot the resulting market betas vs. leverage for the bank stock as well as the CDX indexes in Figure 1 . Graph A shows the beta from a single-factor model, while Graph B shows the resulting market betas from a Fama-French three-factor model. While not exactly the same, the market betas for the bank stock and CDX IG equity are very similar for given levels of leverage, consistent with the market viewing them as economically similar structures and pricing them accordingly. The results are not as similar between banks and CDX HY equity, although this is not surprising; the reference portfolio of the CDX HY index consists entirely of high yield debt, and the assets of most commercial banks do not contain similar levels of risk.
Adjusted R-squared values in Table 3 for market beta, the results for adjusted R-squared indicate that CDX equity is explained by equity market factors, and this stands in contrast to most of the fixed income assets considered which do not appear to be related to equity market factors.
IV. Is CDO Equity like Bank Stock?
The results in the previous section are consistent with CDO equity being priced similarly to stock. The next question is: what kind of stock? We wish to determine which industry returns are most similar to CDO equity returns. To make this determination, we run a regression of excess CDX equity returns on the excess Fama-French 12-industry returns,
where R t is the excess return for one of the CDX equity tranches, and R i t is the excess sector return for industry i. Despite the economic similarities between CDO equity and bank stock, it is not obvious ex ante that CDX equity returns are most similar to the finance sector or bank stock. Recall that the reference portfolios consist of our CDX indexes consist of corporate debt that is diversified across industry sector, so it would not be entirely surprising if the returns to our CDX equity tranches were better explained by an industry sector other than finance.
The results of the regression specified in Equation (3) are reported in Table 4 . It can be seen that, for every CDX equity tranche, the beta estimate on the finance industry is positive and significant. With a few exceptions, none of the other industry betas are statistically significant and, among those that are, the results are not consistent between the various CDX equity tranches (for example, the beta for the telecommunications industry is significant for the IG 3 returns, but not for any of the other CDX equity tranches). Similarly, the pairwise correlations between the CDX equity returns and the Fama-French 12-industry finance sector are higher than the correlations between CDX equity returns and the other industry groupings.
In untabulated results, we repeat the analysis in Equation (3) The results of Table 4 and our untabulated analysis are consistent not only with CDX equity being priced similar to equity in general, but the finance sector and banks in particular. Thus the market appears to value CDO equity similar to its stock market equivalent.
V. What Kind of Banks are Similar to CDO Equity?
Having established that CDO equity is like bank stock, we turn our attention towards determining what kind of banks are most similar to CDO equity. Not all banks are the same and some are more similar to CDX equity than others. For example, the CDX index consists of corporate debt and while some banks count a large portion of commercial loans in their portfolio, others hold little or no commercial debt. Further, the funding of banks is subject to liquidity shocks, such as "runs" on the bank by depositors, the availability and cost of wholesale funding, or corrective action by regulators, such as the FDIC. These types of liquidity shocks can cause the bank to fail if they cannot convert some of their assets to cash. CDO equity, on the other hand, is not subject to these kinds of shocks, having effectively "locked in" the funding source when they were created and sold. To determine the characteristics of those banks which are most similar to CDO equity, we calculate the correlation ρ ij between the weekly returns for each CDX equity tranche i and each bank j over the entire sample period. 13 We then estimate the parameters of 13 Correlations are calculated across the entire sample period, and calculations with less than 52 observations are thrown out. All bank characteristics are measured at the beginning of the sample period.
Accounting data for banks and bank holding companies are from regulatory filings from the Federal The bounded support for the correlation ρ ij raises a potential concern within a linear regression, so we transform ρ ij using a logit transformation which maps ρ ij to the whole real line.
14 The independent variables include ln(Asset Size) j , the log of the total assets, Commercial Loans j , the ratio of commercial loans to total assets, Core Funding j , the core funding ratio, and Equity Capital j , the ratio equity capital for each bank i. Among other things, asset size may capture some of the likelihood that the bank is holding derivatives similar to CDO equity (the larger the bank, the more likely this is the case).
We therefore expect the coefficient on asset size to be positive. Commercial loans is a proxy for the level of similarity between the assets of a particular bank and CDX equity;
the CDX indexes consist entirely of corporate debt and so the higher the percentage of assets consisting of commercial loans for a given bank, the greater the economic similarity between that bank's stock and CDX equity. We therefore expect the coefficient estimate on commercial loans to be positive. Core funding is a proxy for the stability of a banks funding, and the higher the level of financing stability, the more economically similar the bank is to a CDO structure. We therefore expect the coefficient estimate on core funding to be positive. Finally, the more similar the level of equity capital of a bank is to the thickness of CDX equity tranche j, the higher we expect the correlation to be.
All variables are measured at the beginning of the sample period and are from the bank regulatory filings from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and made available through WRDS. Accounting data was matched to returns in CRSP using a join table from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Results from estimating Equation (4) are contained in Table 5 Taken together, bank assets seems to explain much of the correlation between CDX equity and individual bank stock returns in the cross section. For the largest banks, the percentage of commercial loans is also important. Core funding does not appear to explain the correlation between bank stock and CDX equity.
VI. Are CDO Equity Returns Driven by Fundamentals?
Another angle from which we can study how the market values "toxic assets" such as CDO equity is to examine whether their returns can be explained by fundamental factors implied by no-arbitrage CDO valuation models. In doing this, our approach closely parallels that used by Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) who regress credit spread changes on changes in the variables that appear in various structural credit models.
They find that changes in these fundamental structural variables explain only a relatively small portion of the variation in credit spread changes. Following Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin, our approach will be to regress CDO equity returns on changes in key variables suggested by fundamental CDO valuation models. 
where L t is the total fraction of portfolio credit losses at of date t. This expression is the equivalent of a long position in L t and short call option on L t with strike price M . Clearly, the present value of the expression in Equation (5) variance of a Poisson process are proportional to the intensity. In turn, the intensity can be mapped into the credit spread of the debt securities in the underlying portfolio.
Because of this standard credit modeling framework, these types of CDO valuation models all imply that there are at least two key categories of factors driving CDO equity values: the probability of default for assets within the underlying portfolio and the correlation of default events. To capture these, we estimate the coefficients of a model of CDX equity returns similar to Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001),
As in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin, we include ∆y 10yr t , the weekly change in the ten-year Treasury rate, (∆y 10yr t ) 2 , the weekly change in the Treasury rate squared, and ∆Slope t , the weekly change in the slope of the yield curve (where the slope is defined as the difference between the ten-and two-year Treasury yields). Similar to Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin, we also included are ∆Volatility t , defined as the weekly change in the average implied volatility of stock options on the underlying CDX constituents, and ∆Jump t , the weekly change in the average slope of the volatility smirk of stock options on the underlying CDX constituents in order to proxy for the risk of jump magnitudes and probabilities (estimated as in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin).
Using the approach of Bharath and Shumway (2008) , we create estimates of the expected default frequency (EDF) for each of the constituents of the CDX IG and CDX HY indexes following an application of Merton (1974) firms each week, and so the average weekly pairwise correlation for this index is based on 3,081 unique observations. We then calculate ∆Correl t as the weekly change in average pairwise EDF correlations of CDX constituent firms.
We also include interaction terms EDF t × ∆Correl t , defined as the average level of constituent EDF measures multiplied by the change in EDF correlations, and ∆EDF t × Correl t , defined as the average change in EDF measures multiplied by the level of EDF correlations. These latter two variables capture non-linear effects due to changes in the average EDF conditional on a given level of EDF correlation, and vice versa. Table 6 reports the results of our regressions. The dependent variables in Panel A include the returns for the CDX IG equity tranches. For these we find that, similar to Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) , the change and squared-change in the ten-year Treasury yield is statistically significant at a reasonable confidence interval for almost all of the tranches. In terms of the variables derived from the underlying portfolio 15 The required data was available for about 80-percent of the constituents in each index. 16 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
17 Results are similar if we use one-month or three-month rolling period.
of assets of the CDX IG index, the average changes in implied volatilities, as well as the interaction terms between EDF and EDF correlations are also statistically significant.
Overall, the adjusted R-squared values are between 0.45 and 0.64.
Panel B of Table 6 includes the results from regression where the dependent variables consist of returns to the CDX HY equity tranches. As with the CDX IG tranches, and similar to Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001), the change and squaredchange in the ten-year Treasury yield is statistically significant for most of the CDX HY equity tranches. However, none of the variabels derived from the underlying portfolio of CDX HY index are significant. The adjusted R-squared values are lower than those of the CDX IG tranches, ranging from 0.20 to 0.28. Thus, it does not appear that fundamentals explain as much of the CDX HY equity returns as they do those of CDX IG equity.
If banks are economically similar to CDX equity, we expect the underlying fundamentals of the CDX indexes to also explain returns to bank stock. To test this possibility, Panel B of Table 6 also includes regressions of fundamentals on the returns of our three bank indexes. Of course, we do not have enough information of the banks asset portfolios to properly construct some of the variables used in this regression. However, we expect that estimates of volatility to our CDX constituents, their expected default frequencies, etc., to be correlated with the loan portfolios of banks. Thus, we use the variables derived from the CDX IG constituents as independent variables in regressions on our bank indexes. We find that the fundamentals driving returns to our CDX IG equitiy tranches also explain much of the returns to our bank indexes, and with similar adjusted R-squared values, which range from 0.54 for the Wall Street bank index, to 0.36 for the small regional banks.
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) also examine the factor structure of the portion of credit spreads changes not explained by fundamental credit variables.
They find that the first principal component explains a large fraction of the variation that is not captured by credit valuation models. As in their paper, we also conduct a principal components analysis of the portion of CDO equity returns not explained by the regressions reported in Table 6 (which we designate the CDO equity return residuals). We find that the cumulative percent of variation in CDO equity return residuals (for both the CDX IG and CDX HY tranches) explained by the first three principal components is 66.5, 86.4, and 93.3 percent, respectively. Thus, our results parallel those of Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin.
VII. Conclusion
The issue of how the market values complex, opaque, credit-related securities has become of fundamental importance in light of their macroeconomic impact in the current financial crisis. This paper examines this issue from a novel perspective by studying how the market values CDO equity tranches.
We find that CDO equity returns can be linked to equity market factors, and are particularly related to bank stock. The intuition for considering equity market factors is that CDOs are often viewed as synthetic versions of commercial banks since they are often formed as banks spin off their assets into conduits and special investment vehicles.
Thus, CDO equity appears to take on some of the characteristics of the banking industry.
While there is an issue of causality in which some of this result may be driven by large banks holding securities similar to CDO equity, we find that some of the correlation between bank stock and CDO equity is explained by the ratio of commercial loans in a bank's portfolio of assets. Thus at least some of the correlation appears to owe to economic similarities between of bank stock and CDO equity.
We also find that much of the variation in CDO equity tranches can be explained by no-arbitrage CDO valuation models. In particular, changes in credit spreads and a measure of default correlations account for 45 to 64 percent of the variation in CDX IG equity returns. We find, however, that the returns for the CDO equity tranches on portfolios of high yield debt are the most difficult to explain in terms of credit valuation models. We also find that the fundamentals that appear to drive CDO equity to a portfolio of investment grade debt also explain returns to bank stock.
These results have many potential implications for the current debate about the viability of banks and policy initiatives to recapitalize banks directly or through the purchase of troubled assets. For example, if the market values these troubled assets in a way that is consistent with the valuation of bank stock, then the economic costs of these two initiatives may be comparable.
Finally, our analysis has focused primarily on CDO equity based on corporate credit
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